Much of the discourse on intersectionality in psychology focuses on how best to observe or even “test" intersectionality empirically. The fetishization of methods as the key to “finding” intersectionality often reflects what I have called elsewhere psychology's “epistemic riptide” (Grzanka & Miles, 2016), which prefigures intersectionality to be the complex covariance of multiple social identities. In this sense, psychology’s pursuit of intersectional methods can betray what Bowleg (2008) called a latent investment in positivism and what sociologists Luft and Ward (2009) described as an intersectionality "just out of reach." Rather than focus first on the question of method, I suggest that some of the earliest writing on intersectionality in (Smith & Stewart, 1983) and beyond psychology (Crenshaw, 1991) offers invaluable theoretical contributions that should undergird attempts to witness intersectional dynamics among structurally vulnerable groups. I’ll discuss a range of quantitative projects that have used “person-centered” statistics to imagine intersectionality beyond multiple intersecting identities. Most importantly, I argue that fidelity to intersectionality’s roots in Black feminist thought is dependent upon both methodological ambidexterity and even promiscuity—a willingness to follow the trouble, even if it sometimes goes against what counts as “good” psychology (Grzanka & Cole, 2021; Lewis, 2021).

DEPARTMENT of PSYCHOLOGY

2022-2023 Psychology Department Colloquium Series
and the
DEI Graduate Curriculum Committee

present

Laura Jamison
Doctoral Candidate, Quantitative Psychology
University of Virginia

“Looking for Differences or Commonalities:
How to Use Statistical Methods to Drive Equitable Research”

The history of social statistics is rooted in eugenics. The driving force for much of statistical methodological development in social science research was in the interest of identifying differences between groups of people (specifically, across races). As a result, our field today still focuses heavily on comparison rather than identifying commonalities of psychological phenomena. This adverse systemic methodological philosophy impacts two areas: the education we receive on available methods, and the work we cite to show that our experiments and statistical analyses are sound. In the interest of driving equity, identifying both differences and commonalities may be of use depending on the topic of research. When comparisons are indeed the beneficial hypotheses of interest, this talk will introduce and provide resources on statistical methods (such as measurement invariance) to ensure responsible and sound comparisons are made. When conducting a comparison is not the most beneficial route, effective methods for investigating commonalities and the functioning of phenomena (such as methods for using the individual as the primary unit of analysis) will be discussed.

Friday, March 24, 2023
1:30-2:30pm
390 Gilmer Hall